University of Miami Business Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 1

Article 3

August 2021

Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential Beginning of The End of The
Objective Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense
Beckett G. Cantley
Northeastern University

Geoffrey C. Dietrich
Cantley Dietrich, P.C.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Beckett G. Cantley and Geoffrey C. Dietrich, Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential Beginning of The End of
The Objective Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense, 29 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2021)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol29/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential
Beginning of The End of The Objective
Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense
Beckett G. Cantley1
Geoffrey C. Dietrich2
I. OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 1
II. THE STATUTORY REASONABLE BASIS DEFENSE ............................... 3
III. CASE LAW APPLYING AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD ............................. 6
A. Cases Applying Objective Standard Upholding Negligence ........ 6
B. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis Finding No Negligence ......... 9
C. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis with Reliance
Component.................................................................................. 10
D. The Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States Case ........................... 12
1. Facts ...................................................................................... 12
2. The Holding on the Tax ........................................................ 13
3. The Holding on the Penalty .................................................. 14
4. The Dissent ........................................................................... 15
V. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 17
A. Post-Decision Application .......................................................... 17
B. Is the Holding Correct? .............................................................. 18
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 20

I.

OVERVIEW

               6662(a) permits the IRS to
impose a twenty-percent (20%) accuracy-related penalty to an
underpayment of tax, and there are several different defenses to this
1
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penalty depending on the facts of the case and the reason for the penalty.3
One of the most common accuracy-related penalties is the negligence
penalty.4 Although there are multiple different reasons for the application
of an accuracy-related penalty, only one penalty may be applied for each
understatement.5 If a taxpayer faces the negligence penalty, one common
            
the relevant authorities.6 Until recently, most courts simply proceeded
through a discussion on whether the authorities suppor  
return position, and did not even reach whether the taxpayer actually relied
on relevant authorities when forming a return position.7 However, over
the past few years, several courts have begun to require a subjective actual
reliance component to the reasonable basis standard, in addition to the
other requirements described under the regulations.8
This article explores these concepts more in detail in six parts. Part II
introduces the statutory reasonable basis defense, reviewing the applicable
regulations9 and the circumstances when the negligence penalty is
applied.10 Next, Part III introduces prior case law analyzing the reasonable
basis defense, ranging from cases applying a more objective reasonable
basis defense, and several courts applying a subjective11 component to the
3

26 U.S.C. § 6662(a): See MARTIN L. FRIED, 2 TAXATION OF SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
§ 34.02 (No. 82, 2020)(Provides a table showing the penalty percentages for the other
accuracy-related penalties).
4
26 U.S.C. § 6662(c). 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b) lists the reasons under which the IRS can
apply an accuracy related penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662. The reasons include negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations, any substantial understatement of income tax, any
substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1, any substantial overstatement of
pension liabilities, any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement, and any
disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance
(within the meaning of section 7701 (o)) or failing to meet the requirements of any similar
rule of law. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b).
5
Smoker v. Commr, T.C. Memo 2013-56, at *18 (2013)(citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.66622(c).
6
26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(B)(ii)(II); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
7
See e.g. Pederson v. Commr, T.C. Memo. 2013-54, at *5859 (2013); TIFD III-E
Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp.3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); Taibo v. Commr, T.C.
Memo. 2004-196, at *7 (2004); Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC, v. Commr, T.C. Memo.
2020-54, at *43 (2020).
8
See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279
(8th Cir. Apr. 24, 2020); Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States., No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *29 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2016); Blue Mt. Energy v.
United.States., 418 F. Supp.3d 901, 908 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 2019).
9
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 1.66624(d)(3)(iii).
10
26 U.S.C. § 6662(c).
11
Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279, at *2333; Blue Mt.
Energy, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *29; Blue Mt.
Energy, 418 F. Supp.3d at 908.
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reasonable basis defense. Until recently, many courts did not examine
whether a taxpayer actually relied on the authorities listed to support its
         " #'   was
objectively supported by the relevant authorities. Part IV examines Wells
Fargo & Co. v. United States in detail including the facts of the case, the
 "!!  '  
transaction12 'easoning that actual reliance is required as
part of the reasonable basis defense.13 The court looked at the broader
 #   ! ! ! % & 
determined the reasonable basis standard also required a subjective actual
reliance component.14 Further, the court determined that a part of the
STARS transaction did not have any purpose other than tax savings.15 Part
V examines how other courts may view this holding going forward and
discusses how the majority incorrectly concluded that under the
       " #'     # 
supported by one or more relevevant authorities, but the taxpayer must
also rely on those authorities when contemplating tax decisions.16 In
circuits requiring an actual reliance on one or more relevant authorities,
taxpayers must document or be able to show that they actually relied on
the authorities cited in support of their case, and the return position cannot
be a position taken after the return is filed to support the return position.
Lastly, Part VI provides an overview of the conclusions reached in this
article.

II.

THE STATUTORY REASONABLE BASIS DEFENSE

Under IRC § 6662(a), the IRS may impose an accuracy-related
 #%   !y percent (20%) of the portion of the
 #! &17 The negligence penalty is
one of the more common accuracy-related penalties a taxpayer faces and,
by statute, may assert reasonable basis as a defense.18 Under IRC
§ 6662     % #         
#! &19 Regulations describe
 % #      #!
the provisions of the internal revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279, at *15$25.
Id. at *25$33.
See id.
Id. at *17$23.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 6662(a).
26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(B)(ii)(II).
26 U.S.C. § 6662(c).
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   #20 The regulations continue to define the boundaries of
  !       " !   !    !  
         !#21 While codified,
case law demonstrates that courts are unlikely to apply the negligence
 !   "     !      
   !  #22
In     , the Sixth Circuit noted that the burden is on
the taxpayer to prove that they did not act negligently in preparing their
        %    !   ! 
"!  #23 The Sixth Circuit then curtailed this broad
  !  "   !t required to be perfect for this
        #24    "   
minds can differ over tax reporting and sometimes the IRS disallows
   #25 Thus, the Sixth Circuit recognized navigating tax
issues can be complicated, and simply because the taxpayer and the IRS
do not interpret the IRC in the same manner does not mean that the
taxpayer is always negligent.26 However, in this case, the Sixth Circuit
     !  "         !
        #27 because the taxpayer
        "
  #28
    %%
     "!  #      
Tre !     "           
basis as defined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section is not attributable to
 #29 As such, a taxpayer that can support their return position
with one or more relevant authorities will not be liable for negligence as
an accuracy-related penalty.30 The reasonable basis standard is defined as
 "   !         #      
20

26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b).
Id.
22
Lemishow v. Comm%r, 110 T.C. 110, 114 (1998) (citing Hitchins v. Comm%r, 103
T.C. 711, 720 (1994).
23
Mortensen v. Comm%r, 440 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 2006).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See id.
27
Id. (quoting Leuhsler v. Comm%r., 963 F.2d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1992)).
28
Id. at 386; see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(ii) (2019) ("Negligence is strongly indicated
where . . . [a] taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a
deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent
person to be $too good to be true% under the circumstances . . ").
29
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
30
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3);
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
21
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        guable
    31 There are five legal standards that
might apply that the taxpayer must overcome to escape the penalty.32 In
order from most to least stringent, the standards are: more likely than not;
substantial authority; realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits;
reasonable basis; and not frivolous.33 To gain a better understanding of
    though the Regulations do not assign a numerical
probability of success that a reasonable basis position must equal or
exceed, the standard is generally regarded as satisfied if the taxpayer has
at least a one in five (or 20%) chance of prevailing . .   34
Although this percentage is not a codified rule, it provides the taxpayer
with a comparative view to how the courts view the different legal
standards.35 Accordingly, reasonable basis, as it requires a much lower
threshold, should be the more easily met standard for the courts view of
   36
As additional support for a lower threshold for the reasonable
        
is reasonable based on one or more of the authorities set forth in § 1.66624(d)(3)(iii)(taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of the
authorities, and subsequent developments), the return position will
generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard even though it may not
satisfy the substantial authority standard . . . 37 The different authorities
listed under 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) open up a cornucopia of
authorities that include case law, the Internal Revenue Code, and the
regulations.38 The regulation limits relevant authority under this section
           gal
          39 Although these
31

Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
See Stuart E. Seigel & Joy Taylor, Its a New Ballgame - Rules to Practice by, 51
MAJOR TAX PLAN. 14-1, 14-3540 (1999).
33
Id.
34
FRIED, supra note 3.
35
Seigel & Taylor, supra note 32 (The most stringent more likely than not standard
is similar to the preponderance of the evidence standard, requiring a finding that there is
more than a 50-percent likelihood that the position taken for an item is proper.).
36
See id.
37
Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2019) describes the substantial standard as an
objective standard involving an analysis of the law and application of the law to relevant
facts. Further, Because the substantial authority standard is an objective standard, the
taxpayers belief that there is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item is not
relevant in determining whether there is substantial authority for that treatment. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). The substantial authority standard is more stringent than the
reasonable basis standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2).
38
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
39
Id.
32
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underlying such expressions of opinion where applicable to the facts of a
particular case, however, may give rise to substantial authority for the tax
     40 Thus, a taxpayer may rely on the advice of a tax
        "        
authorities.41 As a final bone thrown to the taxpayer facing penalties, if a
return position is not reasonably based in the relevant authorities, the
reasonable cause and good faith defense may be available to the
taxpayer.42

III.
A.

CASE LAW APPLYING AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD

Cases Applying Objective Standard Upholding Negligence

In Fidelity Intern. Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, v. United States.,
the court imposed the negligence penalty, but specifically noted the
                
the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under
    43 The court recognized when examining whether
the accuracy-related penalty for negligence was correctly applied, the
court would view the actions of the taxpayer objectively.44 Although not
discussing reasonable basis, the court viewed the underlying reason for the
penalty (negligence) objectively, which arguably shows that reasonable
basis should also be viewed objectively considering that reasonable basis
serves as a defense to the negligence penalty.45
In     ., the Tax Court found the taxpayer liable in part
for the negligence penalty but determined there was a reasonable basis for
a position on an issue which had not been addressed previously by the
court.46               !   
       "         
   !47 This statement further supports the notion that to be
40

Id.
See id.
42
See Treas. Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (No penalty may be
imposed under section 6662 with respect to any portion of an underpayment upon a
showing by the taxpayer that there was a reasonable cause for, and the taxpayer acted in
good faith with respect to, such portion. ).
43
Fidelity Int"l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.
Mass. 2010).
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
Bunney v. Comm"r, 114 T.C. 259, 267 (2000).
47
Id. at 266.
41
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need to be only around twenty percent (20%) likely to be successful on its
merits.48 In items the taxpayer conceded, the court found the taxpayer was
liable for the negligence penalty and did not accept the defense that the
return was complicated and the taxpayer had used a tax program in
completing the return.49 However, even though the court found the text of
                   
                     
inconsistent with ou   50 Thus, the taxpayer was not liable
for the negligence penalty when the IRS interpreted an IRC provision
differently than the court.51 The court, however, does not go into any
analysis of whether the taxpayer relied on the disputed Code section when
preparing the return and did not require the taxpayer to show evidence of
reliance when preparing the return.52
More recently, in          
determine whether petitioners had substantial authority or a reasonable
basis for the tax treatment of items related to their horse breeding
activities, we reviewed a multitude of relevant authorities citied in this
           53 The court further recognized the
    uthority standard is an objective standard less stringent than
the more-likely-than-    54 From this analysis, the court
considered both the substantial authority and reasonable basis standards,
with the substantial authority standard being a more stringent objective
standard than the reasonable basis standard.55 Additionally, the court does
not look to whether the taxpayer actually relied on the authorities in
arguing a return position, but instead analyzed whether the return position
could be supported by the authorities cited in the opinion and in the
briefs.56 This suggests taxpayers may support their return position once the
return is already filed without having actual reliance on the authorities
when preparing the return.57      ription of the reasonable
basis standard directly correlates with the reasonable basis standard being
objective.58 The court does not directly mention whether the taxpayer
needed to rely on the authorities when contemplating tax decisions or
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See id.; see also FRIED, supra note 3.
See Bunney, 114 T.C. at 267.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Pederson v. Comm r, T.C. Memo. 2013-54, at *5859 (2013).
Id. at *58 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2019)).
See id. at *58-59.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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before filing the return, but goes directly into the analysis as to whether
  !       59
In TIFD III-E Inc. v United States, the district court found the
negligence penalty did not apply because the taxpayer had a reasonable
basis; however, the Second Circuit reversed and said the authorities did
not support the reasonable basis standard, but did not specifically address
  !      60 The district
court note                
understatement penalty involve an objective analysis of relevant
  61 Although this does not specifically address the reasonable
basis standard, this further shows that the courts view other related
standards through an objective lens.62 Further, the court noted the Joint
        !   
satisfied, and a taxpayer cannot be found negligent, if its tax position has
a 20% chance of success on   63 The court recognized that even
if a taxpayer reaches the wrong conclusion, they can still act reasonably.64
               
 !      ion leads to tax
          65 The court then
                    
inference from the fact that TIFD did not waive the attorney-client
privilege with respect to the tax advice it received, but instead attempted
       66 Thus, the court recognized
that a taxpayer should not have to waive attorney-client privileged
information in order to raise the reasonable basis defense.67
However, if courts view the reasonable basis defense objectively,
there is no need for the court to examine priviledged information, because
the court will simply evaluate the return position based on the authorities
cited by the taxpayer.68 In many instances, for a taxpayer to show reliance
on relevant authorities before the return is filed, the taxpayer will have to
show conversations between the taxpayer and the attorney.69 The court
59

See id.
TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); TFID
III-E Inc. v. United States, 604 F. App!x 69, 7071 (2d Cir. 2015).
61
TIFD III-E Inc., 8 F. Supp.3d at 147.
62
See id.
63
Id. at 148.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 150-51.
67
See id.
60

68
69

See id. at 151.
See id.
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 " "%#   
and th    $70 The court
  #                
         %     
$71 The court continued by explaining that reading an actual reliance
component into the reasonable basis standard would create overlap with
the reasonable cause and good faith defense, which is meant to examine
 ! "%  72

B.

Cases Applying Reasonable Basis Finding No Negligence

In         #   
petitioner had a reasonable basis for the nontaxability of his Johnston
Island wages is to be evaluated as of . . . the day petitioner filed his 2000
individual Federal income tax retu$73 Thus, the court did not look to
whether the taxpayer consulted relevant authorities before filing the return,
but instead looked at the relevant authorities in effect at the filing of the
return.74 In this case, the Tax Court noted the IRS had not applied
accuracy-related penalties to any other taxpayer litigating the same issue,
and the taxpayer was relying on letters from the IRS saying that the
regulations regarding the subject were current.75 The court observed the
taxpayer could have a reasonable basis even though all the other cases
      ! "%76 The court
concluded by holding the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for his return
position.77
In   , the court found the taxpayer was not liable for
the penalty of negligence because this was a case of first impression for
  !     #    "  "  
appropriate where an issue to be resolved by the Court is one of first
impression involv     "   $78 Further, in a newer
case decided after Wells Fargo & Co v. U.S., the Tax Court in Oakbrook
              #    
70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2020) (#The determination of whether a taxpayer
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account all pertinent facts and circumstances.$).
73
Taibo v. Comm%r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 181, at *7 (2004).
74
See id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Matthies v. Comm%r, 134 T.C. 141, 154 (2010) (citing Bunney v. Comm%r, 114 T.C.
259, 266 (2000); Lemishow v. Comm%r, 110 T.C. 110, 114 (1998); Hitchins v. Comm%r,
103 T.C. 711, 719-20 (1994)).
71
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disagreement among us on whether the contested regulation is valid, and
that might also be some indication of the objective reasonableness of
'%79 In this case, the taxpayer was not liable for the
negligence penalty because the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for relying
on a private letter ruling in regards to setting up a conservation easement.80
In     , the court found that a taxpayer had a reasonable
basis for only part of the return position.81 The taxpayer based their
argument on a footnote from a case that held adversely to the taxpa#'
position, and the court found that this argument did not rise to the level of
reasonable basis.82 However, the court found that the taxpayer had a
reasonable basis for excluding contingency fee payments as income
because the case relied upon, which was overturned after the filing of the
      " #' 83 Again,
even though the court did not directly address whether the taxpayer
actually relied on the source when arriving at a return position, the court
 !   " #     " #'    
evaluated by the authorities that existed at the time the return was filed.84
The court did not require that the authorities be valid when determining a
return position, which occurs prior to filing the return, but instead
evaluated whether the case was good law on the date the return was
actually filed.85

C.
Cases Applying Reasonable Basis with Reliance
Component
In Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, the Government argued the
taxpay$   # !  ! 
existence of that revenue ruling at the time the decision was made to ignore
the clear language of the regulations and to use an artificial price rather
than the actual retail price when computi  %86 Further, the
  &$      
BME did not rely on that ruling, but rather consciously chose to ignore
  %87 In denying summary judgment for the taxpayer,
79
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352, at *43-45
(2020).
80
Id. at *43-44.
81
Campbell v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 20, 31 (2010).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 32.
84
See id.
85
See id.
86
Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103625, at *29 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2016) ($BLET% stands for black lung excise tax).
87
Id.

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

11

the court noted the taxpayer might be able to prevail on reasonable basis,
 $    
 
Revenue Ruling 81-188 when it filed its tax returns during the relevant
 %88 In later proceedings, the court concluded the taxpayer
did not have a reasonable basis for their return position.89 The court began
"  "   ! " $           
U.S.C. § 4216(b) and related federal regulations can serve as a rational
basis for i "  %90 The
court then analyzed whether the relevant authorities could support the
 ! "&    "
    ! "&ion.91 The court, however, did
not directly address the actual reliance portion mentioned in the earlier
hearing, but instead looked at the relevant authorities and determined the
taxpayer could not have formed a reasonable basis from those
authorities.92
In Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, the court
 $          
 " ! %93 However, when the court was
describing the negligence penalty, the c $    
objective standard by which the taxpayer must show that he acted as a
          %94
This creates some disconnect between the negligence penalty and the
reasonable basis standard used as a defense to the negligence penalty. In
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, the court said that while the overall
statutory framework supports actual reliance, this may not be the case
when looking at the negligence penalty with due care language.95 To
determine whether the negligence penalty is applicable, courts examine
  ! "&    "96 Thus, if the courts apply the
88

Id.
Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 901, 908 (D. Utah Sept. 27,
2019).
90
Id. at 907.
91
See id. at 908.
92
Id. at 906#08.
93
Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1013
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
94
Id.
95
See id.; Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 957 F.3d 840, 853 (8th Cir. 2020). See
generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1)(i) (2020); Treas. Reg. § 6404(f)(2)(A) (2020);
Treas. Reg. § 6662(c) (2020).
96
See Fidelity Int&l. Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d
49, 242 (D. Mass. 2010); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147 (D.
Conn. 2014); Hansen v. Comm&r, 471 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006); Candyce Martin
1999 Irrevocable Trust, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
89
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negligence penalty objectively, the courts should also apply the reasonable
basis defense objectively.97

D.

The Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States Case
1. Facts

In 2002, Wells Fargo and Barclays Bank entered into a structured
advantaged repackaged securities   %  &   
Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits on its 2003 tax return.98 The
purpose of claiming foreign-tax credits is to avoid paying taxes on the
same income twice.99 The foreign- "    # ! % 
taxpayer to claim a dollar-for-dollar tax credit against its federal tax
 # "  #&100 Further, in order to claim the
  #        %    & 
 %   "&101
First, it should be noted that the STARS transaction was described in
 %"  # $so complicated, in fact,
that it almost defies comprehension by anyone (including a federal judge)
who is n " &102 In this transaction, Wells
Fargo placed $6.7 billion of income-producing assets into a Delaware trust
and named another Wells Fargo entity (a U.K. resident for tax purposes)
as trustee. Barclays then loaned Wells Fargo $1.25 billion for a five-year
interest in the trust.103 Additionally, Wells Fargo would pay interest on the
loan every month, and Barclays would send a fixed payment to Wells
  %"&104 It is well-established that STARS transactions have
both a loan component and a trust component.105 Further, Barclays did not
really receive funds from the trust because the trust distributions were
  %  &106 The funds were then reinvested into the
trust and Barclays was able to claim a loss as a result of this transaction.
From this transaction, Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits because of
U.K. taxes paid as well as received Bx payments from Barclays, and

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

See id.
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 842.
Id. at 842-43.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
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Barclays received a gain in the transaction from receiving the interest
payments, while the IRS received nothing in taxes.107
In the district court, the jury found the trust component of the
transaction was a sham, but the loan component was not.108 Further, the
court found the Bx payment constituted a tax benefit and Wells Fargo was
subject to the negligence penalty under IRC § 6662(b)(1).109 The
!'#  % $$#% %% ,&$ $ #!  !% $&%  *
evidence that it subjectively based its return position on legal authority,
the government submits that the district court correctly applied the
 " %*-110 However, Wells Fargo claims its return position
&$%  %!  ,!%'* #$!  & # % #' % 
&%!#%$-111

2. The Holding on the Tax
 % #&%  % ,  .$ %#&$% !"!  %  !
reasonable possibility of pre-tax profit, even assuming that Bx was pre-tax
 !%!$ #!-112 In arriving at this holding, the Eighth Circuit
 *+(%#%)"* %$ $ #!.$"* %$! 
taxes were pre-tax income or a post-tax benefit.113 Looking at other similar
cases regarding STARS transactions, the court noted that it does not matter
how the Bx payment is classified because the taxpayer loses either way.114
!&#%"#!'%)"%%,'#*$ #!$'%
Bx payments comes at the cost of $2 in U.K. taxes, to which Wells Fargo
 % %! * $&% %$-115  !&#% ! & ,&$ $
#!.$"#-tax expenses dwarf any income it receives from the trust in
% !# ! )  .$ %#&$% !"!  % $"* $ ! #$! 
"!$$%*!"#!%!&%$!%$%)%&#$-116
In considering whether the payment of U.K. taxes was a pre-tax or
post-tax expense, Wells Fargo cited several cases which the court rejected
as applicable because the facts were distinguishable and those particular
cases did not discuss STARS transactions.117 Further, the court noted that
%,  .$%#&$%!"!  %($$$ %*!"#$!! !*
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 846.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849.

14

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1

m     "'118  %& 
created no value for Wells Fargo outside of generating the foregoing
   # # '119 The court concluded that
the jury did not err in finding that Wells Fargo did not have a valid business
purpose in the STARS transaction.120

3. The Holding on the Penalty
The Eighth Circuit upheld the imposition of the negligence penalty in
this case because Wells Fargo failed to actually rely on the relevant
authority under the rational basis defense.121 The court began by looking
      "& '122
 $)  $&  # $ "   $
upon those authorities in forming its pos'123 Further, the court
    &     # $  ( )    ! 
authority, it must have actually known about those authorities and actually
 " '124 The court noted that
when looking at whether the negligence penalty applied, at least part of
  $      # $)          
 # $)     $  ! 
125
 $  &    (  $ )
require evidence of actual reliance is more consistent with the broader
  $   $ "'126
Next, the court turned to addressing the three arguments set forth by
Wells Fargo. First, Wells Fargo argued a plain reading of the text did not
require evidence of actual reliance on the relevant authorities. In support
          ! " &  
 '#$  &   '  
present in the reasonable basis definition, the court should just objectively
 $% "   )         
relevant authorities.127     & $
118

Id. at 850.
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 852.
122
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2020))). In this context, the court examined
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2020) and determined that under the reasonable basis
defense, a taxpayer has to reasonably base their return position on one or more relevant
authorities. Thus, this is why the court examines the definition of base instead of basis,
because the word base appears in the explanation of the defense.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 852.
125
Id. at 852-53.
126
Id. at 853.
127
Id.
119
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             !  inconsistent with the broader
  128 Further, the court noted that just because other
provisions create actual reliance through different language does not mean
that actual reliance cannot be created through looking at the broader
statutory context129
Secondly, Wells Fargo argued the actual reliance standard would
require the taxpayer to waive attorney client privilege in order to present
evidence the taxpayer actually relied on the relevant authorities.130 In order
for Wells Fargo to show actual reliance on the relevant authorities during
the contemplation process for the tax decisions at issue, Wells Fargo
would have to disclose confidential discussions with their attorneys to
show relevant authorities were actually consulted during the decisionmaking process.131 The court found that other defenses also required the
taxpayer to waive attorney-client privilege, and this alone would not be
enough for Wells Fargo to prevail on the negligence penalty.132 The Court
said that this argument has some a    
    !      133
Thirdly, Wells Fargo argued that, as a policy matter, as long as a
taxpayer gets to a reasonable position it does not matter if it is through
    134 However, the court reasoned
          
requirementit incentivizes taxpayers to actually conform to the requisite
standard of care rather than simply taking the chance that there may be a
            135 Further, the court
concluded by saying that requiring evidence of actual reliance shows a
taxpayer who contemplates the relevant authorities when forming a return
 rhaps less blameworthy or culpable than a taxpayer which
simply ignored the existing authorities in forming its tax position and
attempts to generate a reasonable basis as a post-hoc justification for its
  136

4. The Dissent
Justice Grasz dissented, specifically opposing the majority opinion on
the application of the negligence penalty and the requirement for actual
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1)(i) (2020)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 854.
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reliance.137 Justice Grasz began by arguing that the district court
incorrectly applied Auer 
) tion of its own
regulation.138 However, the majority does not use the same analysis as the
district court in applying the negligence penalty.139 Justice Grasz also
 $%      &"
language, which is    !     ( )
 '140 Justice Grasz further noted a reliance element is specifically
listed in other defenses, such as the reasonable cause and good faith
"    iance on the
defense.141   &
specified authorities to satisfy the reasonable-basis defense, it could have
expressly said so, as it did in setting forth eligibility for the reasonable'142 Additionally, Justice Grasz emphasized that there is no
language in 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-"&   # $ 
   ' 143
Justice Grasz further stated it is the job of the agency or courts to determine
whether a taxpayer has reasonable basis for the return, not for the taxpayer
to show actual reliance.144 He recognized the district court failed to even
    )       !$   
basis under the relevant authorities, leaving the possibility that Wells
Fargo still might be unable to recover even if the defense were analyzed
solely objectively.145 Although the court did not analyze whether the
authorities cited would constitute a reasonable basis, Santander Holdings
USA, Inc. v. United States addressed a different STARS transaction and
  # $) !     
relevant authorities.146

137

Id. at 855-56.
Id. at 855.
139
See id. at 856.
140
Id. (looking mainly at Treas. Reg. § 1.666-3(b)(3), although he considers several other
regulations as well).
141
Id. (the reasonable cause and good faith defense is described in Treas. Reg. § 1.66644).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See Santander Holdings USA v. United States, No. 09-11043-GAO, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118681, at *7 (D. Mass. July 17, 2018).
138
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ANALYSIS

Post-Decision Application

In looking at cases going forward, taxpayers may need to keep better
records or documents showing they actually relied on relevant authorities
when arriving at a return position. However, the Eighth Circuit is one of
the only circuits requiring a taxpayer to prove actual reliance to have a
reasonable basis. Other courts either do not discuss reliance or assume the
reasonable basis standard is objective by going straight into analysis as to
                
relevant authorities.147 Further, in many cases, the reasonable basis defense
and the substantial authority standard are discussed together and are
described as being very similar.148 Courts outside the Eighth Circuit imply
the only difference between the two is that the substantial authority
standard is more stringent than the reasonable basis standard.149 However,
because of the Wells Fargo decision, the reasonable basis standard and the
substantial authority standard are now very different. The reasonable basis
standard now requires that the taxpayer show they actually relied on the
relevant authorities when contemplating a transaction.150 This increases
the burden on the taxpayer who must now clear another hurdle under the
reasonable basis standard when contemplating tax decisions. The
                
       re evidence the taxpayer actually
relied on the relevant authorities.151 However, because of the Eighth
               
stringent, requiring the return position be supported by one or more
relevant authorities and that the taxpayer consulted these authorities before
filing the return.152 Further, this result would allow taxpayers with clear
support, albeit not clear enough, to prevail on the merits, under relevant

147

See, e.g., Pederson v. Commr, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 54, *58-59 (2013); TIFD III-E Inc.
v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); Taibo v. Commr, 88 T.C.M.
(CCH) 181, at *17-18 (2004); Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commr, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) *43
(2020).
148
See, e.g., Southgate Master Fund v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 665 (N.D.
Texas 2009); Burditt v. Commr, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1767, *3841 (1999); Pederson, 54
T.C.M. (CCH) at *5859; Berger v. Commr, 76 T.C.M. (CCH), at *34 (1996).
149
See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH)
at *3841; Pederson, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at *5859.
150
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54.
151
See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp.2d at 665; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH)
at *3841; Pederson, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at *5859; Berger, T.C. Memo. 1996-76, at *34.
152
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54.
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authorities for their position and to still be liable for the negligence penalty
if the authority was not relied upon prior to the filing.153

B.

Is the Holding Correct?

Even though the holding in ____ is persuasive, the overall statutory
framework and prior case law do not explicitly support a subjective actual
reliance component within the reasonable basis standard. Several courts
do not directly discuss the reasonable basis standard but do describe the
negligence standard as being objective.154 This shows that the courts
determine whether the negligence penalty is applicable through an
objective analysis, and thus one of the main defenses to the negligence
penalty should also be viewed objectively.155 This conclusion is consistent
with an objective reasonable basis standard since it provides a defense for
the negligence penalty.156 Additionally, a review of the statutory
framework supports the conclusion that courts should apply the reasonable
basis standard objectively as many other similar standards are objectively
applied as well.157
  ! ' $""around the definition of
#%&# !  " 
to support the position that a taxpayer must have actual reliance on
relevant authorities when contemplating tax decisions.158 For instance, the
definition o      ' #  $ ! % 
establish (an agreement, conclusion, etc.); to place on a foundation; to
!   &159 From this definition, the court
could have reached the completely opposite result. For instance, a return
position can be grounded in authority, even though the taxpayer may not
have consulted with the relevant authorities while completing the return or
contemplating a tax decision. Further, in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC,
153

See id.
Fidelity Int'l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States., 747 F. Supp. 2d 49,
242 (D. Mass. 2010); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147 (D. Conn.
2014); Hansen v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006); Candyce Martin 1999
Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
155
See id.
156
See Fidelity Intl Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 242; Mario J.
Verdolini & Christopher A. Baratta, The Objectivity of the Reasonable Basis Defense to
NOTES
(Jan.
20
2020),
Tax
Penalties,
TAX
https://www.taxnotes.com/taxpractice/penalties/objectivity-reasonable-basis-defense-taxpenalties/2020/02/10/2bqz0?highlight=verdolini (The authors present an alternative
argument that the negligence standard and the reasonable basis standard can be
distinguished even accepting the reasoning of the court.).
157
See Verdolini & Baratta, supra note 156.
158
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54.
159
Base, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
154
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which was decided after Wells Fargo, the court found that a taxpayer had
a reasonable basis for a return position regarding conservation easements
when the court itself had a disagreement about the meaning of a contested
regulation.160    " -3(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.,
tells us that a return position generally satisfies the reasonable-basis
standard if it is based on, among other types of authorities, private letter
#161     "  # 
go into any detail about whether the taxpayer relied upon the language
when forming a return position. 162 This seems to suggest that the Tax Court
may not impose the subjective requirement that has been added by a few
courts.163
Additionally, the court determined  "   
   #              
defense.164 However, since courts often consider or describe the
reasonable basis and the substantial authority standard together, the court
should have taken into account that the substantial authority standard is
       "  #   165 The courts in another line
of cases concluded that, as a result of the substantial authority standard
being met, the reasonable basis standard was also met.166 Under the
reasoning in Wells Fargo & Co., a situation may arise where a return
position meets the objective substantial authority standard, but fails the
less strict reasonable basis standard because the actual reliance component
is not met by the taxpayer.
On one hand, the policy reasons set forth by the Eighth Circuit seem
persuasive and will lead to taxpayers actually consulting authorities before
making tax decisions.167 For example, the court said actual reliance
"     rs to actually conform to the requisite standard of
care rather than simply taking the chance that there may be a reasonable
        #168 This requires that the taxpayer
160

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm$r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352, at *43 (2020).
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)).
162
See id.
163
See id.; Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54; Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United
States, No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *26 (D. Utah Aug. 5,
2016); Blue Mt. Energy v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 901, 906!08 (D. Utah Sept. 27,
2019).
164
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 852.
165
See Southgate Master Fund, LLC v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 665 (N.D.
Texas 2009); Burditt v. Comm$r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1767, *38!41 (1999); Pederson v.
Comm$r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 54, *58-59 (2013); Berger v. Comm$r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH), at
*34 (1996).
166
See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 667; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH)
at *40!41.
167
Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853.
168
Id. at 853-54.
161
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actually consult authorities when performing transactions, and not just
support its decision-making after the return has already been filed.169 On
the other hand, this seems to suggest on some level that just showing the
taxpayer read the authorities presents a good chance the taxpayer and the
IRS will be in agreement on the interpretation of the relevant authorities.170
This is clearly not the case since in Mortensen   !    
minds can differ over tax reporting and sometimes the IRS disallows
    "171 The court continued by sayin !    
transaction is challenged or disallowed, the taxpayer is not liable for
 "172 Thus, simply because the taxpayer holds to a position
contrary to the IRS does not mean that the taxpayer negligently reached
its return position or should be held liable because it did not actually rely
on the authorities when arriving at a return position.173
Further, much of the prior case law does not fully discuss whether the
taxpayer actually relied on the relevant authorities. Instead, the cases either
mention reasonable basis in passing or describe the definition of
reasonable basis and then see if the relevant authorities provide support
  #    
taxpayer relied on the relevant authorities when completing their taxes.
However, the more likely explanation is that the courts assume the
reasonable basis standard is a solely objective standard and it is the
position of the court to determine whether the taxpayer had a reasonable
basis in the relevant authorities for its return position.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit incorrectly held that the reasonable basis standard
requires the taxpayer actually rely on the relevant authorities when
contemplating a transaction and filling out a tax return. Although the
public policy arguments in favor of actual reliance are compelling, looking
through the history and analysis of other courts application of the
      #
taxpayer should not have to show actual reliance, but instead the court
     # 
        #  
possibly shift the standards and generate considerable overlap with the
reasonable cause and good faith defense. For these reasons, courts going
169
170
171
172
173

See id.
See id. at 854.
Mortensen v. Comm#r, 440 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id.
See id.
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forward should continue to apply the reasonable basis standard in an
objective manner.

